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Perhaps the most significant issue 
with deriving policy implications from 
the analysis is Kroenig’s definition of 
superiority itself. In the book’s founda-
tional quantitative analysis, superiority is 
defined by the difference between two 
nuclear states’ numbers of warheads. 
Kroenig acknowledges that this is an 
imperfect measure but downplays the 
limitation’s importance. A true account-
ing of superiority would address not only 
warhead counts but also a wide variety of 
capabilities such as command and con-
trol, delivery vehicles, readiness posture, 
defenses, and the like. In a nuclear peer 
relationship, as between the United States 
and Russia, policymakers will never really 
think about superiority in the way that 
Kroenig measures it. And in other key 
relationships, like between the United 
States and China, capability disparities are 
so large that superiority as a policy choice 
is remote from the most important driv-
ers of nuclear strategy.
By the same token, the rationales 
underpinning the expansion or modern-
ization priorities of today’s major nuclear 
powers are not tied to the aggregate nu-
clear balance among countries. Instead, 
they are efforts to enhance deterrence 
and resilience under specific, stressful 
scenarios where nuclear attack could con-
ceivably be contemplated.
In this sense, the book’s title works 
better as a riposte to Jervis than as a pol-
icy guide. The “logic of American nuclear 
strategy,” after all, has been shaped by 
many considerations, with “superiority” 
being just one among them. And readers 
should be particularly hesitant to accept 
Kroenig’s implication that a U.S. arsenal 
far larger than Russia’s would be an 
unambiguous and unvarnished benefit 
to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, 
Kroenig certainly succeeds in showing 
how and why strategic superiority can 
matter, and his analysis will undoubtedly 
earn a prominent place in both academic 
and policy debates in the years ahead. JFQ
Michael Fitzsimmons is a Visiting Research 
Professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the 
U.S. Army War College.
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I
n this timely book, one of the most 
seasoned observers of Atlantic secu-
rity affairs, Stanley Sloan, offers 
insights about the future of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
These insights are linked to a detailed 
examination of the Alliance’s origins 
and development. Sloan pinpoints three 
key alliance drivers—national interests, 
common values, and political leader-
ship—and offers a carefully circum-
scribed optimistic conclusion: common 
national interests and values are strong, 
but political leadership is volatile and 
in need of constructive and effective 
management.
Sloan’s circumscribed optimism turns 
out to be quite justified. Shortly after the 
publication of the book, Great Britain 
decided to exit from the European Union 
and Donald Trump was elected President 
of the United States. Trump had been 
initially hostile toward the Alliance, label-
ing it “obsolete,” then declaring that it 
no longer was. He disappointed Allies at 
his visit to NATO headquarters on May 
25, 2017, when he refused to explicitly 
back the Article 5 clause. Trump’s speech 
reflected the inward looking and dark 
“American carnage” view of his inaugural 
speech, which is at odds with the reassur-
ances of traditional U.S. policy and the 
speeches of Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis.
Sloan is to the point when he writes 
that if the Allies want NATO, they can 
have it but they should consider putting 
some actions behind their words. Put 
differently, they can wreck the Alliance 
by not investing in it. There is probably 
sufficient commonality of values and 
interests to justify and prolong NATO 
as it currently exists, but new nationalist 
values are entering the arena, and the 
political leaders promoting these new 
values have no real appreciation for the 
Alliance, past or future. This goes not 
only for President Trump, but also the 
Brexit movement, which pretends to be 
pro-NATO but is openly disdainful of its 
European Allies.
The book offers a framework for ap-
preciating this challenging situation. Like 
this reviewer and other observers, Sloan 
did not foresee that the disruptive power 
of nationalism would come from the 
United States and instead zooms in on 
European developments. Naturally, we 
should not discard the possibility that by 
holding back on his NATO commitment, 
President Trump was simply seeking 
better burdensharing. There is wide-
spread agreement, also in Europe, that 
European defense budgets must increase 
to correct the trans-Atlantic bargain. 
However, by reducing NATO to a trans-
actional money exchange—a type of U.S. 
welfare project for European Allies—and 
by being silent on collective geopolitical 
interests, President Trump is effectively 
jeopardizing the political foundation 
of the Alliance. Sloan’s book is an ideal 
gateway to appreciate this challenge and 
its serious implications.
The buildup to the book’s concluding 
section on NATO’s potential for change 
is built on a thorough historical review. 
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The initial section explores Cold War 
NATO, and a second section investigates 
post–Cold War NATO adaptation. It is 
manifestly clear in this investigation that 
NATO walks on two legs: one military 
and one political. Both are needed to 
keep NATO standing. The most explicit 
statement to this effect was the so-
called Harmel Doctrine. This doctrine, 
formulated by then–Belgian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Pierre Harmel, was 
adopted by the Alliance in December 
1967. The doctrine advocated a strong 
defense combined with good diplomatic 
relations with the Warsaw Pact states. It 
reverberated through the making of all 
European consultation and disarmament 
mechanisms (the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe) and the 
post–Cold War era where NATO became 
the prime motor of continental order. 
The Alliance’s extension eastward thus 
followed. The U.S. congressional deci-
sion to back NATO enlargement defines 
one of the most illuminating sections and 
most personal moments for the author.
As the book makes amply clear, conti-
nental order in Europe is based on a mix 
of allied military strength and political 
commitment to principle. Defense of the 
West effectively communicates that if 
Allies allow collective principles to erode, 
they are tempting adverse political change 
of continental consequences. The same 
can be said for the global order, which 
is American-inspired and American-led. 
The book mentions, but does not delve 
into, this global dimension, which is 
evident in NATO’s global network of 
partners that was dramatically extended 
and solidified by the Afghan campaign of 
the last decade. For Sloan, political prin-
ciple both in Europe and globally amount 
to the same thing: a liberal-democratic 
reservoir of energy supportive of the 
U.S.-led international order. However, 
it is a potential for support that will be 
realized only by steady political leadership 
and continued engagement. Secretary 
Mattis’s new defense strategy contains an 
entire line of effort that appears to recog-
nize that.
Sloan has, over the course of decades, 
tracked the trans-Atlantic bargain and 
probed the potential for a fully fledged 
Atlantic community. Today, the bargain 
remains, while the community is a vision 
struggling against nationalist values.
Defense of the West reads exception-
ally well. More importantly, its clear 
argument that NATO has endured on ac-
count of interests, values, and leadership 
make it ideal for personal reflection or 
classroom education. Anyone who takes 
an interest in the future of the Alliance, 
Europe, and global security will find this 
book simultaneously thought-provoking 
and indispensable. JFQ
Sten Rynning is Professor of International 
Relations in the Department of Political Science 
at the University of Southern Denmark, where 
he also heads the Center for War Studies. Dr. 
Rynning was a Visiting Professor at American 
University when he wrote this review.
New from 
NDU Press
for the Center for Complex 
Operations
Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of 
the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the 
World of Social Media
by Heidi A. Urben
Past research 
contends 
that with the 
exception 
of voting in 
Presidential 
elections, 
military offi-
cers’ politi-
cal participation is fairly muted. 
Through a survey of more than 
500 military elites attending the 
United States Military Academy 
and National Defense University, 
this case study seeks to establish 
the nature and extent of politi-
cal expression throughout social 
media and whether such expression 
is in keeping with the norm of 
nonpartisanship.
Findings suggest that while most 
military elites continue to identify as 
conservative and Republican, fewer 
appear to do so today than at any 
other time over the past 30 years. 
Military elites who identify as liber-
als and Democrats are more likely to 
have more politically diverse military 
friends on social media, but are also 
more likely to report feeling uncom-
fortable by their friends’ politics. 
This study concludes by considering 
the implications these findings carry 
for the norms of an apolitical, non-
partisan military.
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